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Abstract
Data on consumption, earnings, wages and hours dispersion over
the life cycle is commonly viewed as incompatible with a Pareto ef-
ﬁcient allocation. We show that a model with preference and wage
shocks and full insurance produces the rise in consumption, wages
and hours dispersion over the life cycle found in U.S. data. The ef-
ﬁcient allocation model requires an increasing preference shifter dis-
persion proﬁle to account for an increasing consumption dispersion
proﬁle. We examine U.S. data and ﬁnd support for the view that the
dispersion in preference shifters increases with age.
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11 Introduction
A common ﬁnding from U.S. repeated cross-section data is that dispersion
in consumption, wages and earnings increases with age. Figure 1 displays
dispersion patterns based upon U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX)
data over the period 1981 to 2003.1
Insert Figure 1 Here
The standard explanation for the pattern in Figure 1 relies upon idiosyn-
cratic shocks that are not completely insured. It is now routine to posit that
idiosyncratic shocks impact wages or earnings and that they are transmitted
to consumption as some friction makes all or part of these shocks eﬀectively
uninsured.2
The literature contains virtually no attempts to interpret the patterns in
Figure 1 within a model with full risk sharing. The paper by Storesletten,
Telmer and Yaron (2001) is, to our knowledge, the only exception. They ask
if a model with non-separable preferences between consumption and leisure
can generate hours and consumption patterns similar to those in Figure 1.
They ﬁnd that there are no utility function parameters for which their model
produces the observed rise in consumption dispersion over the life cycle to-
gether with only a “small” rise in hours dispersion.3 They conclude that this
ﬁnding casts doubt on the full risk-sharing model and, thus, strengthens the
argument in favor of models with uninsurable, idiosyncratic risk.
We show that the dispersion patterns in Figure 1 can be reconciled with
an eﬃcient allocation under full information. First, we present a simple
model of eﬃcient allocations under full information that exactly replicates
the linearized proﬁles in Figure 1. This holds for a standard separable utility
function with elasticity parameters within the range of those estimated in the
literature. Our model has wage shocks as well as preference shifter shocks.
1The methodology employed to produce Figure 1 follows Deaton and Paxson (1994) in
using a time and age dummy variable regression. Our data and methodology are described
in the Appendix.
2See Huggett (1996), Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (2004), Heathcote, Storesletten
and Violante (2004), Krueger and Perri (2006), Guvenen (2006), Huggett, Ventura and
Yaron (2007) and Kaplan (2007), among others, for work based upon this type of mecha-
nism.
3They require that the “small” rise in the variance of log hours over the life cycle is .08
or less. The rise in Figure 1, for the linearized hours proﬁle, from age 28 to 62 is .02.
2Within this model, preference shocks produce all of the rise in consumption
dispersion, whereas wage shocks produce all of the rise in hours dispersion.
Second, we examine the same micro-level data on consumption, wages and
hours worked on which Figure 1 is based to determine whether or not there
is support for the proposition that the dispersion of preference shifters in-
creases with age. We present evidence that the variance of preference shifters
increases with age. These ﬁndings suggest that the eﬃcient allocation view
is actually up to the standard of matching the patterns of Figure 1.
We focus on a speciﬁc set of facts. This impliesthat our results should not
be taken as suggestive of a likely success of theories featuring full insurance
in interpreting all aspects of the joint distribution of household consumption,
wages and hours. 4 Rather, our results simply show that the facts in Figure
1, related to the rise in cross-section inequality, are consistent with a theory
featuring full insurance.
Our model requires a mild increase in the dispersion of hours worked
with age to match the facts. We view this is as consistent with the fact
that the hours dispersion proﬁle over the life cycle is basically ﬂat. However,
depending on sample selection criteria, this proﬁle has been found to be
either slightly increasing, slightly decreasing or U-shaped - see the Appendix.
While a decreasing hours dispersion proﬁle cannot be produced by our simple
model, such a proﬁle is also problematic for incomplete insurance models -
see Kaplan (2007).
Section 2 outlines the model and discusses it’s implications for interpret-
ing inequality over the life cycle. Section 3 estimates the life cycle dispersion
proﬁle of preference shifters. Data sources, sample selection criteria and
empirical methods are described in an appendix.
2M o d e l
We analyze an overlapping generations economy. In this economy agents face
idiosyncratic productivity and preference shocks. A continuum of agents is
born at each time t. The size of each birth cohort is denoted by Nt.A g e n t s
are characterized by their age j, their year of birth b,a n dt h e i ro w ns h o c k
4Cochrane (1991) and Attanasio and Davis (1996) examine data on household con-
sumption growth, and ﬁnd it hard to square with an eﬃcient allocation. On the other
hand, Altug and Miller (1990) consider several moments of the data, and ﬁnd support for
an eﬃcient allocation model.
3history sj =( s0,s 1,...,sj). At any age j =0 ,1,...,J there is a ﬁnite number
of possible shock histories sj for the agent that occur with probability P(sj).
An agent’s productivity w(sj) and preference shift z(sj) are exogenously
determined by the shock history.
Agents care about expected utility derived from consumption and labor.
The functions cb(sj)a n dlb(sj) denote age j consumption and labor in history
sj for an agent born in year b. Expected utility takes the following form,
where u is a period utility function, β is a discount factor and ϕj is the














At time t = 1 a planner maximizes the weighted sum of individual expected
utilitiessubject to a resource constraint. The planner’s objective includes the
remaining expected utility of agents born before t = 1 and lifetime expected
utility of agents born at time t ≥ 1. The planner assigns weight γb > 0
to the agents of cohort b. The objective in the Planning Problem can be
conveniently stated by noting that time t, birth year b and the age j of an
agent are related via the identity b = t−j. The resource constraint says that
total consumption equals total output at each time period. We assume that


























Nt−jϕj =0 ,∀t ≥ 1
We make the following assumptions on preferences, population growth
rates and planning weights:
A1: The period utility function u is additively separable, strictly concave,
continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing in consumption and decreasing
4in labor. Furthermore, the period utility function satisﬁes the Inada condi-
tions so that the range of the marginal utilities of consumption and labor are
(0,∞] and [0,−∞) respectively.
A2: Nt =( 1+n)t and β(1 + n) < 1.
A3: The Planning weights are set to γb = βb,∀b.
We rewrite the Planner’s objective below, making use of assumptions A2
and A3. This highlights the fact that the Planner faces eﬀectively a sequence
of static maximization problems with the same period objective function and
















Theorem 1: Assume A1 - A3.







subject to the period
resource constraint
 J
j=0 E [c(sj) − l(sj)w(sj)]
ϕj
(1+n)j =0 .
(ii) The time-invariant allocation (c∗(sj),l ∗(sj)) i st h eu n i q u es o l u t i o nt o
the Planning Problem.
Proof: See the Appendix.
2.2 Reinterpreting the Dispersion Proﬁles
We now relate the solution of the Planning Problem to the empirical proﬁles
in Figure 1. To do so, we assume that the period utility function is of the
class in assumption A1’. The parameters (φ,ρ) of this utility function have
been the focus of a large literature which is reviewed and summarized by
Browning, Hansen, and Heckman (1999). In this literature φ is interpreted
as the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, whereas ρ is interpreted
both as the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion and the inverse of the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution.









5Theorem 2: Assume A1’, A2 and A3. Furthermore, assume wages and
the preference shifter have a variance that rises linearly with age so that
var(logwj)=gw+vwj and var(zj)=gz+vzj,w h e r e(gw,v w,g z,v z) are posi-
tive constants. Then the unique solution to the Planning Problem (c∗(sj),l ∗(sj))
has the property that within a birth cohort or in cross section, the variance
of log hours and the variance of log consumption rise linearly with age:
Δvar(logl∗
j)=( 1 /φ2)Δvar(logwj)=( 1 /φ2)vw
Δvar(logc∗
j)=( 1 /ρ2)Δvar(zj)=( 1 /ρ2)vz
Proof: The uniqueness and time invariance of the solution follows from
Theorem 1. The linear rise in the variance follows from plugging the utility
function into the necessary conditions for an interior solution to the Planning
Problem, taking logs, and then taking variances. These conditions are that














We now determine if the solution to the Planning Problem can match the
linear rise in the variance proﬁles in Figure 1 for parameter values that are
consistent with those estimated in the literature. Directly from Figure 1 we
calculate that the empirical slopes of the wage proﬁle vw, labor proﬁle slopel
and consumption proﬁle slopec are (vw,slope l,slope c)=( .0035,.0006,.0013).
Plugging these values into the conclusion of Theorem 2 gives the two equa-
tions below.
.0006 = slopel =( 1 /φ
2)vw =( 1 /φ
2).0035
.0013 = slopec =( 1 /ρ
2)vz
6These equations tell us two things. The ﬁrst equation tells us that 1
φ = .41
so that the Frisch elasticity of labor supply is .41. This value is consis-
tent with the range of estimates from the literature. Speciﬁcally, Browning,
Hansen, and Heckman (1999, Table 3.3) note that estimates of this parame-
ter for male labor hours vary from nearly zero to about one half. Given that
the parameter vz governing the variance proﬁle of the preference shifters is
not pinned down by the evidence in Figure 1, the second equation tells us
that a solution to the Planning Problem can match the rise in consumption
dispersion in Figure 1 for any positive value of the parameter ρ.
We conclude that it is straightforward to reconcile the empirical rise in
the dispersion of log wages, log hours and log consumption in the U.S., as
documented in Figure 1, with an eﬃcient allocation. This follows from a
standard period utility function using standard estimates of these preference
parameters.5 The key to interpreting Figure 1 in this way is that preference
shifters have an increasing variance with age. To determine whether or not
this interpretation of Figure 1 can be easily dismissed, one would need to
examine the empirical nature of preference variation. We do so next.
3 Dispersion of Preference Shifters
We start our analysis of the empirical nature of preference shifters with a
ﬁrst order necessary condition of the planning problem. This is the ﬁrst
equation below. Assumption A1’ implies that the preference shifter satisﬁes
the second equation. Taking variances of both sides of this restriction among





zj = ρlogcj + φloglj − logwj
5We have conducted a similar analysis that diﬀers in that the information displayed in
Figure 1 is constructed by controlling either for cohort eﬀects or for year eﬀects and the
number of recessionary quarters experienced by a cohort. We use the NBER deﬁnition
of a recession. While the slopes diﬀer from the benchmark analysis in Figure 1, the
Frisch elasticity of labor supply that is required to make sense of hours and wage data,
respectively .21 and .35, remain within the range of estimates from the literature.
7var(zj)=var(ρlogcj + φloglj − logwj)
The variance equation suggests the outlines of a strategy for determining
the nature of the variance of the preference shifter. Simply, the variance of
the preference shifter within a cohort could be measured by the right-hand-
side of this equation. Such an analysis infers the preference shifter variance
conditional on values of the preference parameters (ρ,φ) and, importantly,
assuming no measurement error. We now discuss how to deal with measure-
ment error.
3.1 Preference Shifters and Measurement Error
Assume that consumption, hours and wages are measured with error. Let
a measured (log) variable, say log ˆ x, be equal to the true value plus a mea-
surement error so that log ˆ x =l o gx +  x,f o rx = c,l,w. Then, based upon
the reasoning from the previous section, the preference shifter is related to
measured variables as in the ﬁrst equation below. Assuming that the com-
bined measurement error term (i.e  j ≡− ρ c
j − φ l
j +  w
j ) is independent of
the preference shifter, the second equation follows from the ﬁrst.
zj = ρ(log ˆ cj −  
c
j)+φ(logˆ lj −  
l
j) − (log ˆ wj −  
w
j )
var(zj)+var( j)=var(ρlogˆ cj + φlogˆ lj − log ˆ wj)
The variance equation tells us that the variance of the measured prefer-
ence shifter (the right-hand-side term) equals the variance of the true prefer-
ence shifter plus the variance of the measurement error term. The variance
equation is useful as we would like to know whether the variance of the pref-
erence shifter is increasing with age. This can be determined by examining
how the variance of the measured preference shifter changes with age while
controlling for year or cohort eﬀects. We therefore assume that the variance
of the measurement error term does not vary with age or year. Under this
assumption, Δjvar(zj)=Δ jvar(ρlogˆ cj+φlogˆ lj−log ˆ wj) holds within cross
8section or within cohort. In the analysis that follows, we analyze how the
variance of the measured preference shifter changes with age.
3.2 Empirical Assessment
We calculate the variance of the measured preference shifter within age
groups for each year at particular values for the preference parameters (ρ,φ).
We ﬁx φ at the value φ =1 .0/.41. This value makes sense of the hours
and wage variance proﬁles within the model as discussed in section 2.2. We
then calculate the sample variance of the measured preference shifter within
age-year cells for values of the parameter ρ on a ﬁne grid on the interval
[1.0,4.0].6 The construction of these cells is described in the Appendix. We
regress these variances on dummy variables for age groups and time period
as was done in the construction of Figure 1. We then focus on the age coef-
ﬁcients to highlight how preference dispersion changes with age, controlling
for time eﬀects.
Insert Figure 2 Here
The results of this analysis are contained in Figure 2. Figure 2 shows the
change in the variance of the measured preference shifter across age groups
for diﬀerent values of the preference parameter ρ. For example, at age 40 we
plot the diﬀerence between the age 40 dummy coeﬃcient and the coeﬃcient
on the youngest age group, which is age 28. Figure 2 shows from age 28
to age 62 that the variance of the measured preference shifter rises for all
values of ρ in the range considered. This rise is greater for higher values of
the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion ρ.
The next issue to address is whether the rise in the variance of the pref-
erence shifter, for any value of ρ, is consistent with the rise in consumption
dispersion over the life cycle in Figure 1. For this to hold within the model,
it would need to be the case that the rise in the variance of log consumption
over the life cycle equals (1/ρ2) times the empirical rise in the variance of
the preference shifter. Of course, the rise in the variance of the preference
shifter in Figure 2 depends upon (ρ,φ).
We calculate, based upon the data in Figure 2, that there is a value of
ρ which is consistent with the rise in consumption dispersion over the life
6Browning et. al. (1999, Table 3.1) show that estimated values of ρ are in the range of
below 1 to 4, when period utility is assumed to be separable in consumption and labor.
9cycle. Speciﬁcally, this holds for ρ =2 .5. The rise in preference dispersion is
.29 at this value and, thus, (1/ρ2)×.29 approximately equals .0463, which is
the rise in consumption dispersion over the life cycle from Figure 1.
This type of calculation can be done somewhat diﬀerently. One can lin-
earize the empirical proﬁles in Figure 2 by ﬁtting a linear trend. This yields
an empirical slope value vz(ρ,φ) for each linearized proﬁle. One then asks
whether there is any value of ρ,g i v e n1
φ = .41, such that .0013 = slopec =
(1/ρ2)vz(ρ,φ) holds. This calculation follows from Theorem 2 and Figure 1.
We ﬁnd that the value ρ =2 .25 approximately satisﬁes this equation.
Thus, the upshot of this section is two fold. First, there is evidence that
the variance of the preference shifters rises with age for a range of values of
the preference parameters. This evidence is also relevant for research which
uses the standard competitive labor supply model to interpret data because
the evidence is based upon the assumption that the intratemporal marginal
rate of substitution equals labor productivity each period.7 Second, there
are values of the preference parameters (ρ,φ), that lie comfortably within
the range of estimates in the literature, for which the rise in the variance of
preference shifters is quantitatively consistent with the rise in consumption
dispersion documented in Figure 1.
7The results in Figure 2 do depend on a functional form assumption which is also
commonly used in the labor supply literature.
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11A Appendix
A.1 Data
We employ the publicly available micro data of Krueger and Perri (2006). Their
dataset comes from the CEX and contains household level measures of consump-
tion, male hours and male wages for the 1981-2003 period. We use the ”ND”
consumption measure, which includes nondurable components of household ex-
penditures. To control for family size and composition, we normalize household
consumption using a standard adult equivalent scale.8 Annual consumption is
computed as the sum of quarterly ﬂows, restricting our sample to households
completing all four interviews of the CEX. Annual hours of work of the head of
household “reference person” in the CEX are computed as the product of reported
“hours usually worked per week” and reported “number of weeks worked by refer-
ence person full or part time in last 12 months, including paid vacation and paid
sick leave”. We measure hourly wages as total annual labor income plus transfers
minus taxes, as deﬁned in Krueger and Perri (2006), divided by annual hours of
work.
Our basic sample selection criteria are the same as in the “benchmark sample”
of Krueger and Perri (2006). We additionally restrict the sample to households
headed by a white male that had not retired, was not self employed, working for
the army, or in the forestry/ﬁshing sector. As in Heathcote et. al. (2006), we
also restrict annual hours of work to be between 520 and 5096, reﬂecting high
attachment to the labor force. In order to reduce measurement error in hours, we
further restrict the sample to heads of household who work 24 hours or more per
week and 16 weeks or more per year.
A.2 Estimating Life Cycle Dispersion Proﬁles
The life cycle dispersion proﬁles displayed in Figure 1 and in Figure 2 are con-
structed in two steps. Step 1 is to calculate variances of log consumption, log hours,
log wages and measured log preference shifters for households grouped by age and
year. The construction of the preference shifter proﬁles in Figure 2 requires the
simultaneous observation of consumption, hours, and wages for each household.
This requirement considerably reduces the sample sizes within an age-year cell.
To obtain reasonable sample sizes, we deﬁne a household to belong to cell (a,y)
if the interview year is in [y − 1,y+ 1] and the age of the head of household is in
8The number of adult equivalents is given by
√
a +0 .5c,w h e r ea is the number
of people over 15 years of age and c is the number of people 15 years of age or
younger living in the household.
12[a − 2,a+ 2]. This means, for example, that the relevant variance for the age=28
and year=1985 cell was calculated using data on all households of ages 26 to 30
interviewed in years 1984 to 1986.
The Krueger-Perri dataset contains interviews from the ﬁrst quarter of 1980
to the ﬁrst quarter of 2004. Since we consider only households with four complete
quarterly interviews, our dataset starts in the last quarter of 1980. Also, as in
Krueger and Perri (2006), we consider households whose fourth interview was
conducted in the ﬁrst quarter of any year t as part of year t−1’s data. We drop the
1980observationsbecause ofcell size considerations. Our sample therefore contains
data for ages a =2 5 ,26,...,65 and years y = 1981,1982,...,2003. Consistent
with our deﬁnition of age-year groups, the resulting cells are available for a =
27,28,...,63 and y = 1982,1983,...,2002. The resulting cell sizes range from 66 to
545 observations, with an average of 335 observations.
Step 2 in the construction of dispersion proﬁles is to run an ordinary least
squares regression of the relevant variance in cell (y,a) on age dummy variables
and year dummy variables. The regression equation is additive in age and year and
there are no cross age-year terms. The age coeﬃcients in Figure 1 are normalized
so that the variance at age 40 equals the unconditional sample variance of each
variable at age 40.
A.3 Hours Dispersion over the Life Cycle
Our model implies a positive increase in log hours dispersion over the life cycle
given an increase in wage dispersion over the life cycle - see Theorem 2. The
empirical literature contains at least four diﬀerent versions of the graph relating
age to log hours dispersion, in addition to ours: Storeseletten et. al. (2001) and
Heathcote et. al. (2004) use PSID data, whereas Kaplan (2007) uses both CEX
and PSID data. Examination of these proﬁles and comparison to ours, leads us to
conclude that, varying sample selection criteria and methodology, one can obtain
increasing, decreasing, and U-shaped proﬁles from the same basic dataset.
A.3.1 Proﬁles Based on PSID Data
Storesletten et. al. (2001) present a proﬁle similar to ours in shape but with a
larger rise in dispersion. They focus on ages 24 to 60 and ﬁnd that dispersion
increases by about .08 across these ages compared to .03 in our work. Most of the
rise in dispersion is concentrated after age 50.
Heathcote et. al. (2004) focus on ages 25 to 60 and ﬁnd a U-shaped proﬁle,
where the variance of log hours decreases by around .03 between age 25 and age
40, and then rises by a similar amount until age 60.
13Kaplan (2007) analyzes hours dispersion with respect to potential work ex-
perience rather than age. In PSID data, he ﬁnds that dispersion decreases with
potential experience by around .05 over the experience cycle.9 His proﬁle includes
males ages 20 to 60 but with potential experience levels between 3 and 32 years.
All three proﬁles are based upon PSID data and upon the same age and time
dummy variable regression. Thus, the diﬀerences must be accounted for by diﬀer-
ences in sample selection and ﬁne points related to methodology.
A.3.2 Proﬁles Based on CEX Data
The CEX based proﬁle in Kaplan (2007) directly contrasts with ours. Hours
dispersion in his work decreases with experience by around .05 over the experience
cycle. Households aged 20 to 60 are included in the proﬁle’s computation provided
that potential experience is between 3 to 32 years. Most of the decline occurs in
the ﬁrst 10 years of experience (around .03) with the rest of the experience cycle
characterized by ups and downs of around .02 in magnitude.
To trace the sources of diﬀerences, we recalculate our age proﬁles under several
variations of the sample selection criteria and extend our methodology to control
for additional demographic variables. The main results are shown in Figure A1
and our conclusions are listed below:
(i) Since we do not restrict the sample based on experience, our sample includes
a larger fraction of the older workers compared to Kaplan’s. This explains why
our proﬁle rises at the end of the life cycle while Kaplan’s does not.10 If we take
Kaplan’s sample selection criteria and apply our methodology, we obtain a proﬁle
that is decreasing, but ends early in the life cycle (Figure A1, Proﬁle 1).
(ii) A criterion in our sample selection procedure, not present in Kaplan’s,
excludes households with less than 24 hours worked per week or less than 16 weeks
worked per year. If we relax this criterion, our proﬁle rises early in the life cycle
by a similar magnitude as it does if we employ Kaplan’s sample selection criteria
(Figure A1 Proﬁles 2 and 3). Although the fraction of households in the excluded
set is very small, this additional selection criterion accounts for the fact that our
proﬁle is nearly ﬂat at the start of the life cycle.11 All remaining diﬀerences in
9Kaplan deﬁnes potential experience = age-years of education-6.
10The proﬁle in Kaplan (2007) includes workers with 3 to 32 years of potential and 20
to 60 years of age. Following his sample selection criteria as closely as possible, we ﬁnd
that only 53% of workers older than 45, only 30% of workers older than 49, and only 6%
of workers older than 54, have less than 33 years of potential experience.
11Out of all households with a male head between 20 and 65 years of age, working
between 520 and 5090 hours per year, only 2.3% work less than 24 hours per week and/or
less than 14 weeks per year.
14sample selection criteria have a small impact on results.12
(iii) Controlling for demographics (i.e. race and education) has a minimal
impact on our results.13
A.4 Theorem 1
Theorem 1: Assume A1 - A3.















(ii) The time-invariant allocation (c∗(sj),l ∗(sj)) is the unique solution to the
Planning Problem.
Proof:
(i) By A1, the following two functions are well deﬁned for Λ > 0:
c(sj;Λ)≡ uc(·,z(sj))−1(Λ)
lj(sj;Λ)≡ ul(.,z(sj))−1(−w(sj)Λ)
These functions are continuous in Λ by the continuous diﬀerentiability of the
period utility function and are strictly decreasing and increasing, respectively, by
concavity. The resource constraint is strictly decreasing in Λ. Assumption A1
implies that there are values Λ for which the constraint is strictly positive and
diﬀerent values Λ for which the constraint is strictly negative. The Intermediate
Value Theorem then implies that there is a positive value Λ∗ at which the resource
constraint holds with equality.
12To compare all sample selection criteria, refer to our appendix A1 and Kaplan (2007,
Appendix A and B).
13We control for education and race in a separate exercise. To do this, we regress the
raw data on education, race, year/race interaction, age, year, and age/year interaction
dummies. Then we use those regression residuals to conduct a time-age dummy variable
variance decomposition as described above. The results are almost identical to those shown
in Figure A1. When using our sample selection criteria we do not include race dummies,
since we allow only households with a white Reference Person.
15The candidate allocation is (c∗(sj),l ∗(sj)) = (c(sj;Λ ∗),l(sj;Λ ∗)). This alloca-
tion satisﬁes the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for a solution to this problem. As these
conditions are suﬃcient conditions for ﬁnite-dimensional, concave maximization
problems, the candidate allocation solves the problem. To establish uniqueness,
note that if there were a diﬀerent feasible allocation solving this problem, then a
convex combination of the two solutions would be feasible, by the convexity of the
resource constraint, and would increase the objective since the objective is strictly
concave. Contradiction.
(ii) The time-invariant allocation (c∗(sj),l ∗(sj)) from Theorem 1(i) satisﬁes
the resource constraint to the Planning Problem each period and delivers a ﬁnite
value for the objective function in the Planning Problem by assumptions A2 and
A3. We now argue that there do not exist solutions which deliver an inﬁnite value
for the objective function. Suppose by way of contradiction that there is such a
solution, then in some time period the value of the period objective must exceed
the value implied by the solution constructed in Theorem 1(i). Contradiction.
We now argue that (c∗(sj),l ∗(sj)) is the unique solution to the Planning Prob-
lem. First, any feasible allocation leading to a greater value of the objective must
produce a greater value in some period. By Theorem 1(i) this can not hold. Thus,
(c∗(sj),l ∗(sj)) solves the Planning Problem. Second, it is unique as any alternative
feasible allocation must by Theorem 1(i) deliver strictly less utility at some time
period.  
16Figure 1. Age Variance Profile of Wages, Consumption and Hours





























































3Figure 2. Change in the Variance of Preference Shifters
Source: Author's calculations based upon CEX data 1981-2003.





































































tFigure A1. Dispersion of log Hours by Age and Sample Selection Criteria
Profile 1: Obtained by following the selection criteria in Kaplan (2007), and applying our 
methodology.
Profile 2: Obtained by applying our selection criteria but relaxing the condition that 
households work more than 23 hours per week and more than 13 weeks per year. Also,  we 
have extended the sample to households aged 20 to 24, for comparison purposes.
Profile 3: Obtained by applying our benchmark sample selection criteria extended to 
include ages 20 to 24.
Note: The profiles are normalized so that variances at age 40 equal the unconditional 
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